China’s Annual Military Meeting Reveals Unusual Absence of Top Generals Amid Ongoing Purge

No full generals appeared at the Beijing gathering, highlighting ongoing purges and strain within the CCP’s military leadership.

Chinese military delegates leave the closing session of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Oct. 22, 2022.

An annual military-political meeting in Beijing has drawn attention this year—not for what was said, but for who did not show up.

When Chinese state media aired footage from the Feb. 5 “Capital Military-Political Symposium,” only seven lieutenant generals and 13 major generals were in attendance, with no full generals present.

For analysts of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elite politics, the absence was striking and potentially revealing.

Compared with previous years, when at least one full general attended the high-profile gathering, the 2026 lineup suggests that the CCP’s ongoing purge of senior military leaders may have hollowed out the upper ranks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), leaving what some observers describe as a power vacuum at the top.

The contrast with previous years is sharp.

In 2024, Miao Hua, who was a PLA Navy admiral and the director of the Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department, attended the meeting alongside seven lieutenant generals. In 2025, the deputy head of the same department, He Hongjun, a PLA army general, appeared with four lieutenant generals.

Both men have since been purged and removed from power.

Miao was removed from office in July 2024, while He was expelled from the Party and military ranks in October 2025.

Other senior officers who attended past editions of the symposium have also disappeared from public view or come under investigation. Of the seven lieutenant generals present in 2024, at least one—Zhang Fengzhong, then-political commissar of the PLA Rocket Force—has been purged. Two others failed to attend a key anti-corruption meeting in early 2026, fueling speculation about their status.

Among the four lieutenant generals who attended in 2025, two were absent this year, and their current positions remain unclear.

Over the past three years, only one officer—PLA Air Force Deputy Political Commissar Ji Duo—has consistently attended the symposium. Nearly all others have rotated out, many under clouds of investigation.

The pattern underscores the internal power struggles at the top of China’s military since the CCP’s 20th National Congress in 2022. Since then, at least 15 active-duty full generals have been publicly investigated, while roughly 20 more have effectively vanished from public life. Only four full generals are believed to be functioning normally in their posts, including Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin and Defense Minister Dong Jun.

For a regime that prizes rigid hierarchy and stability, such attrition at the top is highly unusual.

One of the most affected branches has been the PLA Rocket Force, which oversees China’s conventional and nuclear missile arsenal.

Since corruption investigations erupted within the PLA Rocket Force and the former General Armaments Department in mid-2023, the branch has seen three consecutive commanders investigated. Two former defense ministers, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, both with ties to the weapons procurement system, were also purged.

The rocket force, under the Eastern Theater Command of China's People's Liberation Army, fires live missiles into the waters near Taiwan from an undisclosed location in China on Aug. 4, 2022.

Among the seven lieutenant generals at the Feb. 5, 2026, meeting was Ding Xingnong, deputy political commissar of the rocket force—a figure whose career trajectory has drawn scrutiny.

Ding attended the symposium for two consecutive years. Yet he was passed over twice in recent Central Committee promotions and missed key Party plenums, raising questions among analysts about his standing.

Ding previously worked extensively within the General Armaments system before transferring to the rocket force in 2024, placing him inside one of the military’s most politically sensitive sectors.

‘Politics of Public Appearances’

The day after the symposium, Chinese leader Xi Jinping attended a Lunar New Year performance for retired military cadres. Chinese state television footage showed a noticeably smaller group of senior officers accompanying him than in previous years. Only one current CMC member, Zhang Shengmin, was visibly at Xi’s side.

The Lunar New Year event’s format also changed. Rather than the traditional roundtable gathering, where seating arrangements often signal hierarchy and favor, attendees were seated uniformly in an auditorium-style setting.

Shen Ming-Shih, a research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told The Epoch Times that the shift may have been designed to obscure attendance patterns and prevent outside observers from inferring personnel changes.

Chinese state media coverage emphasized that veteran comrades unanimously support the CMC chairman, who is Xi.

But Shen posits that such messaging may itself signal unease.

“In the CCP’s propaganda system, what is lacking is often what is most loudly emphasized,” he said. “The high-profile stress on loyalty suggests differing views within the military.”

U.S.-based China current affairs commentator Tang Jingyuan, analyzing what he calls the CCP’s “politics of public appearances,” told The Epoch Times that in China’s opaque system, visible presence is often a proxy for power.

“[In the CCP,] public appearances by senior officials are signals,” Tang said. “Xi is in a delicate position. There is dissatisfaction within the Party regarding some of his personnel decisions. After taking action against top military leaders, some within the Party believe he disrupted established procedures, which has triggered resistance.”

Under those circumstances, Tang said, Xi may rely more heavily on choreographed public events to reinforce his authority.

Hollowed-Out Chain of Command

The deeper issue may be structural.

The CMC, which commands the PLA, now has five vacant general-level seats out of seven. Dozens of other key posts remain unfilled or occupied only in an acting capacity.

Nevertheless, according to Shen, the pool of qualified lieutenant generals eligible for elevation to full general is limited. Large-scale promotions in the short term are unlikely, leaving critical roles unfilled.

Chinese People's Liberation Army soldiers outside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 3, 2025, ahead of the country's annual legislative meetings known as the "Two Sessions."

Meanwhile, factional politics may further complicate the picture. Xi’s earlier power base in the military, often associated with the former 31st Group Army, has itself been weakened by investigations. A new stable network of loyalists has yet to fully consolidate, Shen said.

Tang said the most important indicators to watch are the Eastern and Central Theater Commands, which are responsible, respectively, for Taiwan contingencies and the defense of Beijing.

“Who is promoted to full general in these commands, and what factional background they have, will be crucial signals,” Tang said. “Traditionally, promotion to full general is a stepping stone to entering the CMC.”

At stake is more than internal reshuffling. In the CCP’s political system, ultimate authority rests on control of the military. Xi’s regime has repeatedly emphasized the Party’s “absolute leadership” over the armed forces, and, more specifically, the CMC chairman’s responsibility system that centralizes power in his hands.

But analysts have noted that there has been little visible, unified endorsement from theater commanders or service chiefs regarding Xi’s recent military purges. In addition, insiders have revealed that certain orders from the CMC have recently been passively ignored by lower-level military commands.

If CMC directives were to encounter passive resistance at the theater level, Tang said, it would suggest that Xi’s grip on the military remains contested.

“In the CCP political structure, the top leader’s power ultimately depends on control of the gun,” he said. “If that control weakens, it means that the foundation of authority is challenged.”

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